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dedicated to the memory of Richard Tieszen, 1951–2017
As Weyl was interested in infinitesimal analysis and for some years
embraced Brouwer’s intuitionism, which he continued to see as an
ideal even after he had convinced himself that it is a practical ne-
cessity for science to go beyond intuitionistic mathematics, this note
presents some remarks on infinitesimals from a Brouwerian perspec-
tive. After an introduction and a look at Robinson’s and Nelson’s
approaches to classical nonstandard analysis, three desiderata for
an intuitionistic construction of infinitesimals are extracted from
Brouwer’s writings. These cannot be met, but in explicitly Brouwe-
rian settings what might in different ways be called approximations
to infinitesimals have been developed by early Brouwer, Vesley, and
Reeb. I conclude that perhaps Reeb’s approach, with its Brouwerian
motivation for accepting Nelson’s classical formalism, would have
suited Weyl best.
1 Introduction
In the 1920s, Weyl doubted that non-Archimedean number systems could
serve to develop real analysis with infinitesimals.1 In his ‘Philosophy of
Mathematics and Natural Science’ of 1926, Weyl advanced the following
argument:
But once the limit concept has been grasped, it is seen to render the
infinitely small superfluous. Infinitesimal analysis proposes to draw
conclusions by integration from the behavior in the infinitely small,
which is governed by elementary laws, to the behaviour in the large
... If the infinitely small is not interpreted ‘potentially’ here, in the
sense of the limiting process, then the one has nothing to do with
the other, the processes in infinitesimal and in finite dimensions be-
come independent of each other, the tie which binds them together
∗ SND (CNRS/Paris IV), 1 rue Victor Cousin, 75005 Paris, France.
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1. There are similar contemporary statements in e.g. Fraenkel 1929, 116–117 and
Skolem 1929, 208. There are many studies of the history of infinitesimals, e.g., for
the early history, Baron 1969; Mancosu 1999; Schubring 2005. See Fletcher et al.
2017 for an overview of later approaches.
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is cut. Here Eudoxus undoubtedly saw right [in stating what be-
came known as the Archimedean axiom]. (Weyl 1926, 35–36/Weyl
1949, 44–45.)
In the 1960s Abraham Robinson showed how to handle this fully in
ZFC and classical model theory, introducing non-standard analysis with
its transfer principle. This encouraged Edward Nelson to develop an ap-
proach likewise based on ZFC but axiomatic. Constructive versions of
their theories have also been developed (yielding, as expected, in gen-
eral somewhat weaker principles). But Weyl for some years embraced
Brouwer’s intuitionism, and continued to see it as a philosophical ideal
even after he had convinced himself that it is a practical necessity for sci-
ence to go beyond intuitionistic mathematics and adopt a formalist atti-
tude. As Hans Freudenthal wrote in his obituary of his friend Weyl,
He decides in favour of Brouwer’s intuitionistic explanation of math-
ematics, but, averse to system-building, he spurns Brouwer’s method
that aims for generality. That is no treason, then the essence of his
mathematics was and remained intuitionistic. (Freudenthal 1955, as
quoted in van Dalen 2005, p.880n44, trl. mine)
After a brief look at classical approaches and constructivisations of
them, I will discuss three attempts at introducing infinitesimals that were
proposed as not only constructive but, in different ways, explicitly Brouw-
erian: one by early Brouwer, one by Vesley based on later Brouwer, and
one by Reeb.
These will not be compared with more recent constructive versions of
formalised nonstandard analysis as to their mathematical merits.2 They
are discussed primarily because they stay close to Weyl’s own interest in
both Brouwerian intuitionism and infinitesimals, but to some extent also
for their own sake, as they remain among the lesser known. It would be
very interesting to see a further mathematical development of Vesley’s ap-
proach, as it is, by design, fully integrated in Brouwerian analysis with
choice sequences; and Reeb’s Brouwerian look at Nelson’s classical non-
standard analysis is of considerable philosophical interest, and would have
been so, I suspect, to Weyl.
2. See, e.g., Palmgren 1995, van den Berg et al. 2012, Ferreira and Gaspar 2015,
Sanders 2018, van den Berg and Sanders 2017, and Dinis and Gaspar 2018. Such
approaches are of particular interest for ‘proof mining’, which is the extraction of
explicit information from proofs (e.g., explicit bounds for existential quantifiers, or
rates of convergence).
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2 Classical and constructive approaches
Robinson’s approach is model-theoretical. It exploits the fact that a the-
ory may have non-isomorphic models to distinguish which would require
a stronger logic. That Peano Arithmetic with first-order logic has a model
that is not isomorphic to the intended one was shown, by classical means,
in Skolem 1934. Robinson established the same for the theory of analy-
sis with first-order logic. The field of real numbers R has an Archimedean
order:
∀x, y ∈ R(x < y → ∃n ∈ N(n · x > y))
The non-standard infinite elements in Robinson’s non-standard model
give rise to a non-Archimedean order, and he proceeded in such a way
that the larger structure is again a field, R∗. By definition, a field F con-
tains, for each of its elements except 0, also its multiplicative inverse:
∀x ∈ F (x 6= 0→ ∃y ∈ F (x · y = 1))
The multiplicative inverses of the infinitely large elements in R∗ are in-
finitesimals.
Robinson’s method enabled him to show
R∗  φ⇔ R  φ
for φ limited to first-order formulas. First-order logic is not strong enough
to distinguish between non-isomorphic models of the theory of real num-
bers. The equivalence (2) is called the Transfer Principle because it states
that, for first-order φ, truth in R∗ transfers to truth in R, and vice versa.
Robinson observed that the philosophical importance of the Transfer
Principle is that, within the limitation to stay with first-order logic, it is a
mathematical rendering of Leibniz’s Continuity Principle:
G.W. Leibniz argued that the theory of infinitesimals implies the
introduction of ideal numbers which might be infinitely small or
infinitely large compared with the real numbers but which were to
possess the same properties as the latter.3
However, neither he nor his disciples and successors were able to
give a rational development leading up to a system of this sort. As
a result, the theory of infinitesimals gradually fell into disrepute and
was replaced eventually by the classical theory of limits.
3. [Note MvA: An example of Leibniz’ saying this is found in his well-known letter to
Varignon of February 2, 1702 (Leibniz, 1859, pp.93-94).]
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It is shown in this book that Leibniz’ ideas can be fully vindi-
cated and that they lead to a novel and fruitful approach to classi-
cal Analysis and to many other branches of mathematics. (Robinson,
1966, p.2, original emphasis)
A largely constructive, version of non-standard analysis had been de-
veloped by Schmieden and Laugwitz (1958) even before Robinson’s classi-
cal work. Their non-standard objects can be considered to be constructive
– they are infinite sequences of arbitrary rational numbers – but classi-
cal reasoning is used to reason about their properties. Also their transfer
principle was limited; their R∗ was not a field but only a partially ordered
ring. Inspired by Schmieden and Laugwitz, a fully constructive counter-
part to Robinson’s work has been developed by Erik Palmgren. It turns
out that full Transfer would require a change in the logic: the following is
the argument presented in Palmgren 1998, p.234.
Theorem 1 (Moerdijk and Palmgren). A full constructivisation of Robin-
son’s Transfer Principle demands a nonstandard interpretation of the logi-
cal symbols.
Proof 2. Assume that ∀xP (x) is an as yet undecided formula in arith-
metic, where P contains no unbounded quantifiers. (Goldbach’s conjecture
is of this form.) We can decide all instances up to any given bound, so
N  ∀m(∀n < mP (n) ∨ ∃n < m¬P (n))
Suppose now we have a Transfer Principle:
N∗  φ⇔ N  φ
Let m ∈ N∗ be infinite. By transfer from N to N∗, either for all n we
have N∗  P (n∗), where n∗ is the image of n ∈ N in N∗, or N∗  ∃n <
m¬P (n). Transfer back from N∗ to N yields N  ∀xP (x) ∨ ¬∀xP (x). This
contradicts our assumption.
Inspired by Robinson’s theory, but wishing to reconstruct it in syn-
tactic rather than model-theoretical terms, Edward Nelson proposed In-
ternal Set Theory (IST) (Nelson, 1977).4 Another syntactic approach had
been invented just before him by Hrbaček, and closely related work (but
incompatible with ZFC) by Vopenka had begun even earlier; for the his-
torical details, I refer to the rich footnote 7 in Kanovei and Reeken 2004,
p.vii. I will here look at IST, and in some detail, not so much because it
4. For an introduction to Nelson’s approach, see his more explanatory first chapter of
a projected book Nelson 2002 and Robert 1988.
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is the best known and most used syntactical nonstandard analysis, but
because it was part of Reeb’s Brouwerian approach that we will see in
section 8. It should be mentioned, however, that further development of
both Nelson’s and Hrbaček’s work have led to theories with more attrac-
tive metamathematical properties.5
Instead of enriching the ontology by adding nonstandard objects to
the set of classical real numbers, Nelson enriches the language we have
to talk about the latter.6 The idea is that, from a formal point of view,
a distinction between standard and nonstandard numbers useful for the
development of analysis can already be made within the set of classical
real numbers; what matters is that this is done in such a way that the
right formulas become provable.
Nelson adds an undefined predicate ‘standard’ to the language of ZFC
and adds three axioms to the theory that regulate its use; just as in ZFC,
the relation ∈ is undefined. As the phrase goes, ‘its meaning is implicitly
defined by the axioms’; but course that is not a specification of a meaning
in the sense of presenting a construction method or a meaning explana-
tion in the sense of, for example, Dummett and Martin-Löf.
In the axioms for ‘standard’, the following shorthand is used:7
∃ stxφ(x) for ∃x(x standard ∧ φ(x))
∀ stxφ(x) for ∀x(x standard→ φ(x))
∀ st finxφ(x) for ∀x((x standard ∧ x finite)→ φ(x))
∀ st infxφ(x) for ∀x((x standard ∧ x infinite)→ φ(x))
Then the new axioms are introduced, formally, and without pausing to
motivate them. Formulas not containing the predicate ‘standard’ are said
to be internal (namely, to ZFC), those containing it external:
5. The culmination of this is HST in Kanovei and Reeken 2004; but it does not con-
tain full ZFC as a proper part. See also footnote 45, below.
6. It is, in fact, possible to look at Robinson’s nonstandard analysis in an entirely
formalistic way, and take it not to introduce new objects, but new ways of deducing
theorems. Robinson points this out at the very end of his book:
Returning now to the theory of this book, we observe that it is presented, natu-
rally, within the framework of contemporary Mathematics, and thus appears to
affirm the existence of all sorts of infinitary entities. However, from a formalist
point of view we may look at our theory syntactically and may consider that
what we have done is to introduce new deductive procedures rather than new
mathematical entities. (Robinson, 1966, p.282)
I have not highlighted this in the main text, so as to be able to show the contrast
between the model-theoretical and the syntactical approaches.
7. The predicates ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ are defined as usual, in terms of the presence or
absence of a bijection between x and the set {m | m < n} for some n ∈ N.
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The axioms of IST are the axioms of ZFC together with three ad-
ditional axiom schemes which we call the transfer principle (T), the
principle of idealization (I), and the principle of standardization (S).
They are as follows.
Let A(x, t1, . . . , tk) be an internal formula with free variables
x, t1, . . . , tk and no other free variables. Then
(T) ∀ stt1 . . .∀ sttk(∀ stxA(x, t1, . . . , tk)→ ∀xA(x, t1, . . . , tk))
Let B(x, y) be an internal formula with free variables x, y and possi-
bly other free variables. Then
(I) ∀ st finz∃x∀y ∈ zB(x, y)↔ ∃x∀ styB(x, y).
Finally, let C(z) be a formula, internal or external, with free vari-
able z and possibly other free variables. Then
(S) ∀ stx∃ sty∀ stz(z ∈ y ↔ z ∈ x ∧ C(z)).
(Nelson, 1977, p.1166)
We may not use external predicates to define subsets, as the axioms
of ZFC that would have to be used to prove the existence of these subsets
do not know how to interact with the undefined predicate ‘standard’. (It
is for this reason that not all of Robinson’s nonstandard analysis can be
reconstructed in IST.) It is the role of the standardization axiom (S) to
form standard subsets of standard sets. Note that standard sets may well
contain nonstandard elements; we will see that N does, and in a sense
that is the whole point of IST.
As IST is not an ontological enrichment of R, Weyl’s question how the
dimensions of the finite and the infinitesimal are related for IST does not
point to a problem with an ontological aspect.
William Powell proved, by model-theoretical means, that IST is con-
servative over ZFC and hence consistent relative to ZFC (Nelson, 1977,
section 8).8
In the following, we will look at a few theorems of IST, in order to
8. Nelson himself later provided a purely syntactical proof that proofs in IST can be
reduced to proofs in a standard system ZFC[V] which is itself conservative over
ZFC (Nelson, 1988). Kanovei and Reeken have shown that actually the presenta-
tion of IST there is stronger than that in Nelson 1977, and that not all properties
of the later version are shared by the earlier one. However, they add that this is
the case if only bounded sets are considered, and that in practice these are the ones
that matter (Kanovei and Reeken, 2004, p.128).
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demonstrate how IST proves that N contains nonstandard numbers, which
are greater than any standard number; this mostly with an eye on the
discussion of Reeb’s Brouwerian take on IST in section 8.9 Their recipro-
cals are infinitesimals.10
First, a strengthening of (T) together with its dual form:
Theorem 3 (Ts). ∀ stt1 . . .∀ sttk(∀ stxA(x, t1, . . . , tk)↔ ∀xA(x, t1, . . . , tk))
Proof 4. From (T) and ∀xφ(x) → ∀ stxφ(x).
Theorem 5 (Tsd). ∀ stt1 . . . ∀ sttk(∃ stxA(x, t1, . . . , tk)↔ ∃xA(x, t1, . . . , tk))
Proof 6. Apply Ts to ¬A, negate both sides of the bi-implication, and
use ¬∀x¬A↔ ∃xA.
An immediate consequence of Tsd is:
Theorem 7. If ∃!xA(x), and A(x) is internal, then x is standard.
In particular, N is standard.
There is a dual of (I):
Theorem 8 (Id). ∃ st finz∀x∃y ∈ zB(x, y)↔ ∀x∃ styB(x, y)
Proof 9. Apply (I) to ¬B(x, y), negate both sides, push the negations
inward, and cancel double negations.
The key theorem of IST is this, which entails that nonstandard ob-
jects exist formally:
Theorem 10. Let X be a set. Then
X is a standard finite set⇔ Every element of X is standard
Corollary 11. Every infinite set has a non-standard element. In fact, it
has infinitely many non-standard elements, because whenever we remove
one non-standard element from it, the theorem applies again.
First we prove
Lemma 12.
X is a subset of a standard finite set⇔ Every element of X is standard
9. The references for theorems 3–15 are Nelson 1977 and Nelson 2002.
10. In IST it is also possible to prove of R directly that it contains infinitesimals. But
the approach through N fits Reeb’s motivation better.
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Proof 13. Set B(x, y) = x ∈ X ∧ x 6= y and apply the dual of idealisation
(Id) to ¬B(x, y):
∃ st finz∀x∃y ∈ z¬(x ∈ X ∧ x 6= y)↔ ∀x∃ sty¬(x ∈ X ∧ x 6= y)
Applying logic to the the right hand side, we get
∃ st finz∀x∃y ∈ z¬(x ∈ X ∧ x 6= y)↔ ∀x ∈ X(x standard)
and to the left hand side,
∃ st finz(X ⊆ z)↔ ∀x ∈ X(x standard)
Proof 14 (Proof of Theorem 10). Left to right: The assumption that X
is a standard finite set gives, together with X ⊆ X, ∃ st finz(X ⊆ z), and
now apply Lemma 12 from left to right.
Right to left: Assume that every element of X is standard. By Lemma 12,
from right to left, we have ∃ st finz(X ⊆ z). By ZFC, the power set of z,
P (z), exists:
∃x∀y(y ∈ x↔ y ⊆ z)
This formula is internal, and P (z) is unique, so, by Theorem 7, P (z) is
standard. It is also finite, because z is. Applying the proof in the previous
paragraph for the direction from left to right to P (z), all elements of P (z)
are standard, and as X ∈ P (z), in particular X is. Finally, X is finite
because z is.
By the corollary to Theorem 10, N contains a nonstandard number;
this may be thought of as a proof that the natural numbers we usually
work with, 0, 1, 2, . . . do not exhaust N. This idea became important to
Reeb; see below, section 8. Also by the corollary, there is no set contain-
ing exactly those natural numbers that are standard natural numbers; as
mentioned, the set-forming principles of ZFC do not have a grip on the
predicate ‘standard’. Finally, we have
Theorem 15. The nonstandard numbers in N are greater than all its
standard elements.
First we prove
Lemma 16. Two standard sets are equal if they have the same standard
elements.
Proof 17. Apply (T) to A(x, t1, t2) = x ∈ t1 ↔ x ∈ t2.
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Proof 18 (Proof of Theorem 15). Let n ∈ N be nonstandard. By (S),
there exists a standard subset of N, notation S{z ∈ N | z < n}, such that
it includes all standard elements of N that satisfy z < n; by Lemma 16,
that set is unique.11 Obviously, any standard element of S{z ∈ N | z < n}
is a standard element of N. On the other hand, if z is a standard element
of N, then the set {w ∈ N | w ≤ z} is a standard finite set. Theorem 10
entails that all its elements are standard, hence n 6∈ {w ∈ N | w ≤ z}, and
z < n. It follows that S{z ∈ N | z < n} and N have the same standard el-
ements. Both are standard sets, so Lemma 16 applies and S{z ∈ N | z <
n} = N.
From a radically formalist position the axioms could be left unmoti-
vated, once the axioms are shown or at least believed to be consistent.
Nelson’s paper includes a (relative) consistency proof; in his later book
chapter, there are informal considerations for accepting them. I single out
the one for (I), as it is the one that formally implies the existence of non-
standard objects:
The intuition behind (I) is that we can only fix a finite number of
objects at a time. To say that there is a y such that for all fixed x
we have A [i.e., B(x, y)] is the same as saying that for any fixed fi-
nite set of x’s there is a y such that A holds for all of them. (Nelson,
2002, p.5)
Nelson acknowledged of course that there is informal discourse in
mathematics, and the term ‘fixed’ belongs to that realm (Nelson, 2002,
p.1). But since Nelson’s reflected judgement is that there is no mathe-
matical reality, be it intuitionistic or Platonic, and that strictly speak-
ing mathematics consists in formal systems,12 the strict counterpart of
the informal discourse’s notion of being fixed for him must be found in a
property of formal proofs. The statement ‘we can only fix a finite num-
ber of objects at a time’ is then mapped to the fact that each proof in the
formal system at hand is a finite object, which therefore leaves room for
only finitely many occasions to define (fix) individual objects and prove
or assume their existence.
An analogous argument for a simpler case is this (presentation after
Palmgren 1993, p.1195):
Theorem 19. Extend Peano Arithmetic with a constant ω and the axiom
schema ω > n, to obtain a nonstandard theory PA∗. Then PA∗ is conser-
vative over PA.
11. But (S) does not guarantee that it does not also contain nonstandard elements.
12. See on this also chapter 32, ‘A modified Hilbert Program’, in Nelson 1986.
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Proof 20. Assume we have a formal proof of A(ω). As the formal proof
is finite, only finitely many instances of the schema occur in it, ω > n1, . . . , ω >
nk. Define m = max(n1, . . . , nk) + 1, and replace, in the original proof, ω
by m everywhere.
Below, in section 8, we will see that according to Reeb, who was not
a formalist and who held that there is a mathematical reality which fur-
thermore is constructive, there is in mathematical reality a motivation for
introducing the predicate ‘standard’ in ZFC, and from there for accepting
the formal theory IST.
3 Three Brouwerian desiderata
Turning now to Brouwer’s writings, one may distill three desiderata for
constructions of infinitesimals:
1. They should be intuitionistic constructions, i.e., be built up starting
from ‘the basic intuition of mathematics’:
the substratum of all perception of change, which is divested
of all quality, a unity of continuous and discrete, a possibility
of the thinking together of several units, connected by a ‘be-
tween’, which never exhausts itself by the interpolation of new
units. (Brouwer 1907, p.8, trl. Brouwer 1975, p.17):
Further on in the dissertation Brouwer specifies that this basic in-
tuition consists in the awareness of time as pure change (Brouwer
1907, pp.98–99) that it and our construction acts on it are not of a
linguistic nature (Brouwer 1907, p.169) and that there is not also a
spatial continuum that is a priori given to us (Brouwer 1907, p.121).
2. Logical reasoning about them should be done according to the na-
ture of mental constructions. This respects the essential non-linguistic
character of mathematical construction, and the nature of logic,
such as Brouwer describes it, as a study of the patterns in descrip-
tions of that activity (Brouwer 1907, pp.131-132; Brouwer 1908).
Whatever logical principle one has recognised as correct on this con-
ception should be allowed in one’s reasoning.
3. They should be geometrical in nature. Brouwer defines geometry as
follows:
Geometry is concerned with the properties of spaces of one
or more dimensions. In particular it investigates and classi-
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fies sets, transformations and transformation groups in these
spaces.
The spaces under consideration are built up out of one or more
Cartesian simplices,13 which can be connected in different
ways; consequently a space is not completely defined by its di-
mension alone. (Brouwer 1909, p.15, trl. Brouwer 1975, p.116)
The classical and constructive nonstandard-models of the previous sec-
tion obviously do not meet these desiderata, and neither does a purely
axiomatic approach. But it is of course just as clear that there will be
no direct intuitive construction of infinitesimals on the one-dimensional
continuum. If in the next section the reason for this is spelled out, that
is because it adds relief to Brouwer’s construction in section 6 of a real
number that is greater than 0, but of which we cannot indicate a positive
distance from 0; this is the kind of construction that Vesley took up, as
we will see in section 7.
At the same time, it should also be noted that even in classical non-
standard analysis there is a large constructive element om the following
sense: Once non-constructive methods have been employed to obtain in-
finitesimals, the reasoning often proceeds constructively, employing stan-
dardisation at the very end to return to the realm of the standard. That
topic has recently been explored in great detail in Sanders 2018.
4 The impossibility of a direct construction on the one-dimensional
continuum
The intuitive continuum as given in what Brouwer calls the basic intu-
ition of mathematics has no scale on it.14 Brouwer’s ‘between’ is not in-
trinsically tied to intervals of any size, because if there is no scale then
there are no sizes, in particular no infinitesimal ones. This intuitive ‘be-
tween’ precedes the construction of a scale, and the scale is constructed
by ‘the interpolation of new units’ on it.
Putting a scale on the intuitive continuum is itself a construction pro-
cess that takes place over time. The human mind is limited in such a way
that in a given time interval we can only place finitely many points of a
scale on the intuitive continuum, or begin a potentially infinite sequence
of such placements. Between any two previously placed points, an intu-
itive continuum remains, and if we choose to do so, we can place a fur-
ther point on this ‘between’, and thereby continue the construction of our
13. In two dimensions a simplex is a triangle with all its interior points; in three di-
mensions a pyramid with a triangle as its base.
14. The primary reference for this paragraph and the next is Brouwer’s dissertation,
Brouwer 1907, pp.8–11, but the argument is general.
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scale into it. If we iterate this everywhere, in a potentially infinite pro-
cess, we construct a countable, everywhere dense scale. We can correlate
the points on this scale with any number system we have constructed of
the order type of Q; we may begin by correlating an arbitrary point on
the scale with 0 and another one with 1. We thus obtain a ‘measurable
continuum’ (Brouwer 1907, p.11).
Once the construction process of the rational scale has begun, we then
construct points or real numbers (including the embedding of the ratio-
nals) p by constructing potentially infinite sequences of nested intervals
with endpoints on the scale p0, p1, p2, . . . As a point does not exist on
the continuum prior to our construction, it is identified with the develop-
ing sequence, as opposed to an independently existing limit to which the
sequence converges. If two points p and q are not equal, this unequality
must consist in the fact that starting from a finite index n, the intervals
pn and qn do not overlap. As the intervals are determined by rationals,
we can determine a natural number m such that mp > q or, as the case
may be, mq > p. So the system is Archimedean, and infinitesimals or in-
tervals of infinitesimal length do not exist. To construct an infinitesimal
interval on the intuitive continuum, we would have to be able to con-
struct a point p such that ¬(p = 0) but of which it is contradictory to
assume that the unequality to 0 arises at some pn for natural n (i.e., at a
rational distance from 0). That is impossible.
We will see in section 6 that, with the admission into intuitionism of
choice sequences, we can construct a real number r that is unequal to 0
and of which we cannot indicate the interval rn at which the unequality
to 0 arises until a certain proposition P has been decided. But before P
has been decided we can already show that it is contradictory to suppose
that the unequality to 0 arises at no finitely indexed interval.
The fact that there are, in the basic intuition of mathematics, no di-
rect motivation and no direct construction for infinitesimals (as objects
constructed on the one-dimensional continuum), the development of a
theory would have to proceed, just as in the classical case, either by an
embedding of the standard real numbers into a more-dimensional struc-
ture, and thereby no longer take propositions in analysis of the one-dimensional
continuum at face value, or construe talk about nonstandard objects as
talk about certain standard objects.
5 Brouwer’s non-Archimedean numbers
Early Brouwer’s construction of non-Archimedean numbers discussed in
this section was not meant to lead up to a form of infinitesimal analysis.
However, that would have been a first step, so the general considerations
are of interest to the present discussion.
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When Brouwer was working on his dissertation, non-Archimedean
fields and geometries had been constructed by notably Veronese, Levi-
Civita, Pasch, Hilbert, and Vahlen,15 and these he refers to in his note-
books and in his thesis, with an emphasis on Hilbert. Brouwer criticised
these approaches: Veronese’s was not constructive in his sense, and those
of Pasch, Hilbert and Vahlen are not geometrical in his sense.
In Veronese’s Fondamenti di Geometria of 1891, a real number is con-
strued as the ratio of two magnitudes (both of the same species), one of
which is designated to be the unit; and the existence of a segment that
is infinitesimal with respect to another is postulated. Veronese can do so
because, as he states in his introduction, ‘A thing postulated by thought
one can consider as given to thought, and inversely’ (Veronese, 1891, In-
troduzione, section 18, trl. mine). For Brouwer, on the other hand, only
that what has been constructed from the basic intuition qualifies as given.
In a notebook that predates his dissertation, he comments:
Veronese’s fuss, with his constantly introducing hypotheses, is noth-
ing but forming logical assemblies; if for certain things (I do not
know whether they exist) such and such relations hold, then also
such and such relations. (Brouwer, 1904–1907, Notebook 3, p.35,
trl. mine)
Hilbert’s non-Archimedean geometries are criticised for their non-
geometrical nature. In the synopsis for his dissertation, Brouwer writes:
Hilbert’s pseudo-geometries are (in contrast to the non-Euclidian) of
little importance, because they have been built within a rather ‘far-
fetched’ building [i.e., construction] (while the non-Euclidian in the
ordinary Cartesian space). (Brouwer 1904–1907, p.405, trl. mine)
Brouwer is referring to the fact that the coordinates of points in the space
are not real numbers but objects of a higher type, namely certain alge-
braic functions on the real numbers (Hilbert, 1899, p.25). Such algebraic
functions may themselves be represented (extensionally) geometrically,
but Brouwer’s hesitation here would be that each such representation is
not a point in a (n-dimensional) Cartesian space. Hilbert, of course, pro-
posed his non-Archimedean geometry first of all in the service of an inde-
pendence proof of the Archimedean axiom, and then Brouwer’s consider-
ations are not that important. But such geometries soon turned out to be
of interest in their own right.
In his dissertation, Brouwer presents an alternative non-Archimedean
15. An extensive historical treatment is Ehrlich 2006.
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continuum, a(n intended) construction in his specific, non-axiomatic sense
of that term, in an ordinary Cartesian space (Brouwer 1907, pp.67–73).
It is, he states (Brouwer 1907, p.140n) a generalization of that in Hilbert
1899, section 34.
By Brouwer’s de facto phenomenological consideration, given in the
previous section, a non-Archimedean (mathematical) continuum cannot
be constructed on the one-dimensional intuitive one. His strategy there-
fore was to construct a multi-dimensional mathematical continuum and
define a subset on it which he calls ‘the pseudo-continuum’. The pseudo-
continuum can be linearly ordered and the one-dimensional continuum
embedded into it.
Brouwer starts with an infinite-dimensional Cartesian space of (ω∗ +
ω)n dimensions, where ω∗ is . . . ,−3,−2,−1. Each coordinate has (in-
stead of a letter) an ordinal number in between −ωn and ωn, which can
be written in the form a1ωn−1 + · · ·+ an−1ω + an, with −ω < ai < ω. To
the coordinate then is associated the n-tuple of indices 〈a1, . . . , an〉.
The ‘pseudo-continuum’ now consists of the subset of points in the
space with the property that for all their coordinates whose value is not
0 we can indicate lower bounds on the ai: the property, in other words,
that non-zero values are not found at arbitrarily low coordinate numbers.
This in turn means that the coordinate numbers corresponding to those
n-tuples form a well-ordered set (i.e., a set of which each non-empty sub-
set has a first element). So for any two distinct points p, q there will be a
smallest coordinate number at which they differ, and therefore the set can
be linearly ordered.
The one-dimensional Archimedean continuum is embedded into the
pseudo-continuum by assigning the point on the former with coordinate
x to the point on the latter whose coordinates are all 0 except that its
0-coordinate is x. One may view the pseudo-continuum as a real contin-
uum with infinitely many points inserted to the right and left of each real
point, and with infinitely many pseudo points to the left and right of the
real continuum as a whole.
The operations + and × are understood group-theoretically, that is,
as parametrised transformation operations +a and ×a.
Theorem 21 (Brouwer 1907). On a measurable continuum, there is only
one construction for a two-parameter continuous uniform transformation
group
x′ = c1 × x+ c2
namely the one in which + and × are ordinary addition and multiplica-
tion (and hence commutative). (Brouwer 1907, pp.32–33)
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On the pseudo-continuum he then defines a two-parameter continuous
uniform transformation group that preserves + and × on the embedded
one-dimensional continuum, but whose multiplication is not commutative
on the pseudo-continuum as a whole.
The group operation + on the pseudo-continuum is induced by the
+ operation on the scale of each of the coordinates. It is associative and
commutative. The operation × on the pseudo-continuum is defined as an
operation that shifts coordinates; 11× shifts the number of a coordinate
to the right by one while mapping the 1-points of the scales of each coor-
dinate onto one another. Likewise, 1ω× shifts the number of a coordinate
to the right by ω while mapping the 1-points onto one another. Brouwer
determines conditions on the the choices of the 1-points on the scales of
coordinates 1, ω, ω2, . . . that will guarantee that × is associative and dis-
tributive with +.
But × on the pseudo-continuum has been defined so as not to be com-
mutative: for example,
11 × 1ω = 1ω+1
but
1ω × 11 = pω+1
where p is the point on the scale of coordinate 1 chosen to be the 1-point
on that scale. In general, 1ω+1 and pω+1 are not equal.
Theorem 21 then implies that this pseudo-continuum is not a measur-
able one. Brouwer remarks that this pseudo-continuum is not continuous
in Dedekind’s sense (which would have implied it is Archimedean), but it
is in Veronese’s (Brouwer 1907, pp.72–73 ).16
An objection to the way the pseudo-continuum is constructed is that
it presupposes the Principle of the Excluded Middle: In order to obtain
the linear ordering of its points, it must be possible to decide whether a
sequence that proceeds infinitely to both sides is from a certain element
onward constant zero to the left. This is similar to a problem in another
part of his thesis, which is flagged and discussed in the corrections that
he published in 1917: When moving down along a branch in a tree, one
cannot, in general, decide whether each future node will have a unique
descendant (Brouwer 1917, p.440).
At the time, Brouwer accepted the Principle of the Excluded Middle
because he took P ∨ ¬P to be equivalent to ¬P → ¬P (van Dalen, 1999,
pp.106-107). Constructively, it is not; Brouwer presented the correct read-
16. See on this point Ehrlich 2006, 69-71.
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ing, according to which PEM is valid only for decidable propositions, in
Brouwer 1908, ‘The unreliability of the logical principles’.17
Moreover, Brouwer’s construction, if successful, would not be a field
extension of the real numbers, so it could not have been used to develop a
nonstandard analysis.
It is not surprising, then, that Brouwer did not develop the theory of
this pseudo-continuum any further.The work on non-Archimedean num-
bers was superseded by Hahn’s paper ‘Über die nichtarchimedischen Grö-
ßensysteme’ (1907), which appeared just too late to be taken into con-
sideration in Brouwer’s thesis, which was defended on February 19 of the
same year. But in 1917, Brouwer referred to it in his list of additions and
corrections to his dissertation specifically for its treatment of commuta-
tive principal operations (Brouwer 1917, p.441).
One of the few people who seem actually to have studied Brouwer’s
pseudo-continuum is Kurt Gödel. In 1941, by which time he had emi-
grated to the United States, he asked his brother who had remained in
Vienna, to order a copy of Brouwer’s dissertation for him (van Atten,
2015, pp.190–191). And indeed, in one of Gödel’s notebooks, probably
filled in 1942, one finds reading notes on Brouwer’s construction.18 Gödel
at the time was interested in the question if there could be non-human
beings in whose awareness time is ordered in a non-Archimedean way
(Gödel, 1906–1978, Max Phil VI (?–July 1942), pp.431–432).
Brouwer made one last remark on non-Archimedean geometry in his
second lecture in Vienna 1928 – with Hahn, who had in the meantime
become a friend of his, in the audience:19
The initial, negative attitude towards these [non-Euclidean or non-
Archimedean] geometries was completely overcome by their arith-
metisation due to Riemann, Beltrami, Cayley, and, respectively,
Levi-Civita and Hahn. In the process, the peculiar fact came about
that the non-Archimedean continuum, which had proved to fulfill
the a priori conditions on the continuum just as well as the Archi-
medean, was brought about in a plausible manner only with the
aid of the latter, so that the calling into question of the a priori ne-
cessity of the Archimedean continuum had to be founded precisely
on the a priori consistency of this continuum. (Brouwer 1930, p.1,
trl. mine)
17. A recent English translation and introduction is van Atten and Sundholm 2017.
18. Gödel 1906–1978, Arbeitsheft 14, pp.21–23; see its page 14 for the year.
19. Brouwer’s Vienna lectures were invited by a committee of which Hahn was a mem-
ber (van Dalen, 2005, p.561).
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6 Brouwer: a real number that is greater than 0, but not measurably
greater
Around 1916, Brouwer introduced choice sequences into intuitionistic
analysis.20 A choice sequence is a sequence of natural or rational numbers
that are freely chosen by the Creating Subject, which is moreover free to
impose restrictions on its choices. Thus we have sequences without any
restriction on the choices (lawless sequences) and sequences determined
by an algorithm or law (lawlike sequences). For Brouwer these are the
extreme cases, with many other kinds of choice sequence in between, no-
tably also choice sequences for which the Creating Subject lets its choices
depend on some of its other mathematical activities. (We will see exam-
ples of this latter kind in this section and the next.)
Brouwer’s rationale for reconstructing analysis in a theory of choice
sequences is that this gives a mathematical, fully constructive model of
the intuitive continuum that faithfully mirrors, not only epistemologically
but ontologically, the fact that the latter is not a composition out of dis-
crete elements.
Weyl, in his intuitionistic period, accepted the theory of choice se-
quences in a modified form that, however, made it incoherent (van Atten et al.,
2002, section 3). Be that as it may, of some interest for our present theme
is Weyl’s intention to accept universal quantification over lawless sequences
but to insist that instantiations are lawlike, for in this way he is in effect
treating lawless sequences as nonstandard objects. For Weyl, only lawlike
choice sequences could exist as individuals. Brouwer’s particular choice
sequence that is the topic of the present section would not have been ac-
knowledged as an individual mathematical object by Weyl.
The introduction of choice sequences did not affect early Brouwer’s
observation on the impossibility to construct a non-Archimedean scale.
The reason is that the latter observation is made at such a high level of
generality that it also subsumes choice sequences. Yet, in the Cambridge
Lectures (1946–1951) Brouwer states that
the intuitive ‘between’ surely requires as well that the continuum
contains further point cores between, for instance, the origin on the
one hand and all rational point cores on the other. (Brouwer, 1981,
p.50)
A ‘point core’ is an equivalence class (or rather a ’species’) of choice se-
quences, the criterion being that they are all co-convergent. Brouwer
20. For an introduction to choice sequences, with particular attention to philosophical
and mathematical differences between Brouwer’s theory and Weyl’s adaptation of
it, see van Atten et al. 2002; for their history, Troelstra 1982.
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seems to be saying here that one can construct points that are not 0 yet
whose distance from 0 is smaller than any rational number we will ever
construct; he seems to be saying that we can construct infinitesimals. It
will turn out that this is not quite what is meant.21
To show Brouwer’s argument for this claim, his definitions of some
order relations are needed (Brouwer, 1949c, p.1246n). Let β and γ be two
real numbers, i.e., two convergent infinite sequences of rational numbers
β(n) and γ(n). Define β <◦ γ, ‘β is measurably smaller than γ’ as
∃m,n ∈ N∀v ∈ N
(
v ≥ m→ γ(v)− β(v) > 1
2n
)
Correspondingly, γ ◦> β means that γ is ‘measurably greater’ than β (Brouwer,
1951, p.3). Write
β 6= γ for ¬(β = γ)
β ≥ γ for ¬(β <◦ γ)
β > γ for β ≥ γ ∧ β 6= γ
So being measurably greater, defined as a double existential statement, is
a positive property, while being greater, defined as in effect a conjunction
of two negations, is a negative property.
The apartness relation (Brouwer, 1949c, p.1246n) is defined as follows:
β # γ ≡ ∃k ∈ N
(
|β − γ| > 1
2k
)
or, equivalently,
β # γ ≡ β <◦ γ ∨ β ◦> γ
The definition of a choice sequence, and so in particular of a point
core that it represents, may be made to depend on what goes on in the
subject’s other activities in between the choices of the elements in this se-
quence, notably with respect to attempts to settle a certain problem. For
example, in between two choices, the subject may have decided a propo-
sition P , or have tested it. A proposition P is decided by either proving
P or proving ¬P ; it is tested by either proving ¬P or ¬¬P . Decidability
implies testability. If P holds, then so does ¬¬P , and if ¬P , then ¬P ; so
P ∨ ¬P implies ¬P ∨ ¬¬P . But testability does not imply decidability.
For suppose we can prove ¬¬P but not (yet) P ; then P has been tested
21. The same construction is also in Brouwer 1948, but there Brouwer does not add the
comment quoted above.
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but is still undecided.
Weak counterexample 22 (Brouwer). There is no hope of showing that
∀α(α > 0→ α ◦> 0).22
Plausibility argument 23. Let P be a proposition that we cannot test,
in the weak sense that we do not now possess a proof of ¬P ∨ ¬¬P .23
The Creating Subject constructs a real number α in a choice sequence
of rational numbers α(n), as follows:
• As long as, when making the choice of α(n), the Creating Subject
has obtained evidence neither of P nor of ¬P , α(n) is chosen to be
0.
• If between the choice of α(n− 1) and α(n), the Creating Subject has
obtained evidence of P , or has obtained evidence of ¬P , α(n) and
all α(n+ k) are chosen to be (1
2
)n.
The choice sequence α converges, hence α is a real number.24 We have
α = 0↔ ¬P ∧ ¬¬P
Hence α 6= 0. We also have ¬(α <◦ 0) because, by definition of α, no α(n)
is ever smaller than 0; and their conjunction gives α > 0.
But we do not have the stronger α ◦> 0 because if we had, then
∃m,n ∈ N∀v ∈ N
(
v ≥ m→ α(v) > 1
2n
)
and this is only possible if P would have been decided, and hence tested;
but this contradicts the hypothesis that P cannot be tested yet.
This is what Brouwer means when, in the quotation from the Cam-
bridge Lectures above, he says that there are point cores between the ori-
gin and all positive rational point cores. If, by developing more mathe-
matics, we do come in a position to test P , that is we can find a proof of
22. In the next section, we will see that Brouwer also had a proof of the actual nega-
tion, ¬∀α(α > 0 → α ◦> 0) (Theorem 28).
23. Brouwer could have given this argument in terms of an undecidable proposition
instead of an untestable one. The reason he uses an untestable one is that in his
paper he exploits almost the same construction to prove that 6= cannot be de-
fined as a disjunction of < and >, as that would lead to the contradiction that an
untestable proposition is testable. For further discussion of Brouwer’s weak and
strong counterexamples, see van Atten forthcoming.
24. Let ǫ be given, and determine an n such that 2−n < ǫ. Construct the sequence α
up to α(n), which can be done as each choice is decidable. If α(n) = 0, all further
choices will be in the interval [0, 2−(n+1)] and hence within ǫ from one another. If
α(n) 6= 0, then the choices in α have already been fixed, and hence within ǫ from
one another.
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¬P or a proof of ¬¬P , then the number α becomes rational, and, in the
sense of these order relations, no longer lies between 0 and all rational
point cores. Note that this does not mean that α was irrational before.25
Brouwer does not go on to connect his example of a number between
0 and all the rationals in any way to infinitesimals. That would be done
by Vesley.
7 Vesley’s α-infinitesimals
Vesley realised that real numbers like the one in Brouwer’s example are,
although not infinitesimals in an ontological sense, in an important re-
spect similar to infinitesimals (Vesley, 1981).26 The same observation was
made independently in van Dalen 1988, p.191.
Vesley appeals to Kripke’s Schema:
(KS) ∃α(∃nα(n) = 1↔ P )
where P is a variable for propositions, and α for choice sequences. Brouwer
had demonstrated this before Kripke did but never used it again, and
instead reasoned from the general principles from which KS quickly fol-
lows.27 These principles were later codified by Kreisel in the so-called
‘Theory of the Creative Subject’ (or ‘Creating Subject’). For discussion of
the Creating Subject and KS, see Myhill 1966; Kreisel 1967; Troelstra and van Dalen
1988, ch.4; van Atten 2004, ch.5; and van Atten forthcoming.
I will adapt Vesley’s construction somewhat to Brouwer’s way. Let α
be a choice sequence (whether of convergent rationals or not). Define a
real number x as follows:
• As long as, when making the choice of x(n), the Creating Subject
has obtained evidence of neither ∀nα(n) = 0 nor of ¬∀nα(n) = 0,
x(n) is chosen to be 0.
• If between the choice of x(n− 1)and x(n), the Creating Subject has
obtained evidence of ∀nα(n) = 0, x(n) and all x(n+ k) are chosen
25. Before, it was a growing construction for a real number that had yet acquired nei-
ther the property of being rational, nor that of being irrational.
26. I don’t think Vesley knew of that particular passage in Brouwer, which was pub-
lished only in 1981, but he was of course very familiar with this kind of reasoning,
e.g. Kleene and Vesley 1965.
27. See Brouwer 1954, p.4 for Brouwer’s demonstration, and Myhill 1966, p.295 for
the observation that this is KS. Brouwer does not literally state KS; he constructs,
from an arbitrary proposition P that as yet cannot be tested, an infinite sequence
C(γ, P ), and shows that truth of P and rationality of C(γ, P ) are equivalent.
However, the construction of a witness for KS from C(γ, P ) is immediate; and
Brouwer’s reasoning towards the existence of C(γ, P ) goes through for any P , not
only untestable ones.
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to be (1
2
)n.
• If between the choice of x(n− 1) and x(n), the Creating Subject
has obtained evidence of ¬∀nα(n) = 0, x(n) and all x(n+ k) are
chosen to be −(1
2
)n.
Then we have
∃x ∈ R[(x ◦> 0↔ ∀nα(n) = 0) ∧ (x <◦ 0↔ ¬∀nα(n) = 0)]
and, since α was an arbitrary choice sequence,
∀α∃x ∈ R[(x ◦> 0↔ ∀nα(n) = 0) ∧ (x <◦ 0↔ ¬∀nα(n) = 0)]
Define for every choice sequence the species of real numbers L(α) and
M(α):
x ∈ L(α) ≡ [x # 0↔ ∀nα(n) = 0 ∨ ¬∀nα(n) = 0]
x ∈M(α) ≡ ∃y ∈ L(α)¬(|x| ◦> |y|)
Vesley points out that one can then prove:
Theorem 24. M(α) is a subring of the intuitionistic R.
Theorem 25. ¬∀α∃x ∈M(α)∃n(n · x ◦> 1)
The species M(α) is called that of the α-infinitesimals. These are ele-
ments of (intuitionistic) R, and in this sense the conception is a little like
that in Nelson’s IST, where the infinitesimals are elements of classical R.
Vesley observes that, although we want to think of the α-infinitesimals
as very small, and for that reason give them this suggestive name, should
the question whether α is 0 everywhere be decided, M(α) becomes R.
This goes against the very idea of an infinitesimal. On the one hand, in
light of open-endedness of mathematics, there will always be new open
problems, so this is not much of an objection against the existence of α-
infinitesimals in general. On the other hand, this also means that these
infinitesimals only behave as infinitesimals under universal quantification.
We cannot prove that all species of α-infinitesimals are non-Archimedean;
only that it is not the case that none of them is. Instead of
∀α¬∃x ∈M(α)∃n(n · x ◦> 1)
we only have
¬∀α∃x ∈M(α)∃n(n · x ◦> 1)
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And that the latter cannot be strengthened to the former is intrinsic to
the whole construction. An individual M(α) will be non-Archimedean as
long as it is undecided whether the values of α are 0 everywhere or not,
but becomes Archmedean as soon as this has been decided. And there
cannot be a particular α for which this is never decided, for that would
imply the existence of an absolutely undecidable proposition, which is
impossible:28
Theorem 26 (Brouwer, 1907–1908?). There exist no absolutely undecid-
able propositions.
Proof 27. ‘Can one ever demonstrate of a proposition, that it can never
be decided? No, because one would have to so by reductio ad absurdum.
So one would have to say: assume that the proposition has been decided
in sense A, and from that deduce a contradiction. But then it would have
been proved that not-A is true, and the proposition is decided after all.’
(Note by Brouwer, as quoted in van Dalen 2001, p.174 note a; translation
mine)
That ¬(P ∨ ¬P ) is contradictory, and hence that PEM is consistent,
was pointed out in Brouwer 1908. The quoted argument was never pub-
lished by Brouwer, but Wavre 1926, p.66 and Heyting 1934, p.16 made
the same observation.
Van Dalen, who as mentioned made the same connection between
Brouwer’s weak counterexample and infinitesimals, considered it ‘highly
unsatisfactory to include subjective phrases such as “it cannot be shown”
in mathematical texts’ (van Dalen, 1988, p.191), and points out that in
Brouwer 1949a this result is strengthened from the weak counterexample
‘there are real numbers α that are greater than 0 yet cannot be shown to
be measurably greater than 0’ to the strong counterexample
Theorem 28 (Brouwer 1949). ¬∀α(α > 0→ α ◦> 0)
(Note that intuitionistically this does not imply ∃α¬(α > 0→ α ◦> 0),
which is contradictory.) Indeed, in the demonstration of this theorem, in-
stead of one open problem and unbounded time to solve it, Brouwer con-
siders the infinity of open and solved problems ‘α ∈ Q’ for all α ∈ [0, 1]
with the added condition, which arises from the applicability of the fan
theorem to functions defined on that interval, that they should all be
28. One might think the permanent existence of an α-infinitesimal can be assured by
starting a sequence starting with 0’s and stipulating that one will never make the
decision between (a) restricting the remaining choices to 0 and (b) making a choice
that is not 0. This however will not do, because by choosing 0 until that decision is
made, and at the same time resolving always to postpone that decision, the result
is that the sequence will be constant 0.
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solved on the basis of an initial segment of α of uniform length.29 And
then not only it cannot be shown that this condition can be met (weak
negation), it can be shown that it is leads to contradictions if it could
(strong negation).
Vesley observes that in this version of nonstandard analysis, ‘the ele-
gance of classical nonstandard analysis is missing for the familiar reason
that more distinctions must be recognized intuitionistically’ (Vesley, 1981,
p.211), but because of the dependency of his infinitesimals on universal
quantification he also sees a similarity to the synthetic differential ge-
ometry of Lawvere and Kock,30 which has been developed much further
(Kock, 2006). From a Brouwerian perspective, Vesley’s approach would
philosophically be preferable to synthetic differential geometry (smooth
infinitesimal analysis) in that the latter involves a postulation of the exis-
tence of a line segment of infinitesimal length, which is certainly not given
to us in mathematical intuition.31 Vesley announced a sequel paper to
develop the approach further and to see whether it has advantages of its
own. Unfortunately, it seems that he gave up on the project.
8 Reeb: An intuitionistic take on IST
An approach to infinitesimals that is Brouwerian in a rather different
sense than that defined by the three desiderata of section 3, and one that
would have been of interest to Weyl, was proposed and enthusiastically
defended by Georges Reeb at the University of Strasbourg.32
The mathematical content of nonstandard analyis as advocated by
him is that of his friend Nelson’s IST,33 described in section 2. The orig-
29. Strictly speaking, Brouwer does not consider the question of rationality of each
α ∈ [0, 1], but of each α ∈ J , where J is a fan that coincides with [0, 1]. Note also
that our notational use of α is different from that in Brouwer 1949a.
30. There, ‘nilpotents’, which are δ such that δ 6= 0 but δ2 = 0, may be cancelled when
universally quantified.
31. Compare Brouwer’s objection to Veronese’s postulate above, p. 13.
32. For Reeb’s (philosophy of) nonstandard analysis, see, in French, Reeb 1979,
1981; Barreau and Harthong 1989; Diener and Reeb 1989; Lobry 1989;
Reeb and Harthong 1989; L’Ouvert 1994, and Salanskis 1999. There is not much
about Reeb’s (philosophy of) nonstandard analysis in English; see Fletcher et al.
2017 for a few recent remarks.
33. Nelson has written:
One of the most treasured experiences of my life is my friendship with Georges
Reeb. We had many strong discussions together, intuitionist versus formal-
ist. What he created was unique in my experience. His rare spirit, gentle but
fiercely demanding of the highest standards, inspired a group of younger math-
ematicians with an unmatched ethos of collegiality. And their discoveries are
extraordinary.
Reeb found, and led others to find, not only knowledge and beauty in mathe-
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inality of Reeb’s approach lies in the fact that, instead of construing IST
as an axiomatic theory, in which the predicate ‘standard’ is taken to be
implictly defined by the axioms, he proposes a specifically Brouwerian
motivation for accepting IST as a formal theory. It is, he notes, a train of
thought that starts from intuitionistic observations on ZFC and concludes
to ‘the plausibility or the naturalness of IST’ (Reeb, 1989, p.151);34 and
the article he dedicated to giving his most elaborate account of this, writ-
ten with Jacques Harthong, was, indeed, titled ‘Intuitionnisme 84’ (Reeb and Harthong,
1989).35 The title was, of course, at the same time a reference to Robin-
son’s ‘Formalism 64’ (Robinson, 1965). Just as Robinson asked what for-
malism could be in 1964, Reeb and Harthong had a view on what intu-
itionism could be in 1984. In addition, formalism is an essential com-
ponent of Reeb’s approach, but with a specifically Brouwerian view on
it. On the other hand, Reeb was not a Brouwerian intuitionist, and did
not aspire to be. Reeb and Harthong acknowledge the difference when
they speak of ‘the intuitionistic conception (ours just as much as that of
Brouwer) ...’ (Reeb and Harthong, 1989, p.52).36 Also Harthong in his
afterword to the 1989 reprint of Int84 in La mathématique nonstandard
is quite forthcoming on this point (Harthong, 1989, pp.265–267). Some
differences will be touched upon below.
Reeb holds that there is a mathematical reality, constructive, inde-
pent of theory, and which intuitionists aim to describe;37 formal theories
such as ZFC and IST as constructive objects that codify ideal(ised) the-
ories of that reality, just as we have idealised theories of physical reality
(Reeb and Harthong, 1989, sections 2 and 5). Accordingly, the notion of
motivation for an axiom takes on a richer sense that relates the formal
axiom to mathematical reality. That relation need not be as strong as
the axiom being fully interpretable in that reality; it may rather be con-
strued as an idealisation. This sounds Hilbertian, and it is,38 but it must
matics, but also virtue. His insights into the nature of mathematics will point
the way towards the mathematics of the future. (Nelson, 1996, p.8)
34. In Reeb 1981, p.153, he had stated that his notion of naïve numbers leads to ideas
that ‘show some analogy with IST’, and this is what one expects of a motivation
in constructive reality of a distinction in an idealised, classical formal theory. Note
that Reeb in his writings does not much discuss his philosophical differences with
Nelson. On Nelson’s philosophy of mathematics, see, besides his own papers, also
Buss 2006.
35. 1984 is the year in which a first version was written and began to circulate.
36. ‘la conception intuitionniste (aussi bien la nôtre que celle de Brouwer) . . . ’
37. This attitude was later described by Sundholm and myself as the intuitionists’ ‘on-
tological descriptivism’, an attitude they share with Platonists, the disagreement
being over the nature of that reality (Sundholm and van Atten, 2008, p.71). If we
had known the paper by Reeb and Harthong then, we would surely have taken it
into account.
38. Besides the main influence Brouwer, in Reeb one finds quotations or echos from for
be remembered that it was intuitionistic criticism of his earlier program
that led Hilbert to adopt that particular view, which itself goes back to
Brouwer’s dissertation (1907).39 The terms of the formal theory do, as
such, not refer, but if we construe that theory as an idealisation of re-
ality we must be prepared to act as if they refer to ideal(ised) objects
(Salanskis, 1994, p.30). Consistency or conservativeness of the formal
theory is therefore not the whole criterion: if ZFC is extended with an
independent proposition P , or, alternatively, ¬P , Reeb expresses a prefer-
ence for the one that seems in a sense closer to mathematical reality than
another: writing about Fermat’s Last Theorem in 1989, he says that if it
turns out to be an undecidable proposition, one could of course add its
negation to ZFC, but ‘the intuitionist will consider this choice ... far re-
moved from concrete reality’ – in which by then no counterexample had
been found (Reeb, 1989, p.158).
The importance of Brouwer in Reeb’s view is epistemological, and de-
fined by the insistence that a formal theory, even if shown consistent, can-
not, once constructed, replace mathematical reality (Reeb and Harthong,
1989, section 4), and that, in particular, accepting the Principle of the
Excluded Middle in the formal theory does not mean that every problem
in mathematical reality can be solved. Reeb’s main reference for this is
‘Intuitionistic reflections on formalism’ of 1928, in which Brouwer writes:
The disagreement over which is correct, the formalistic way of found-
ing mathematics anew or the intuitionistic way of reconstructing it,
will vanish, and the choice between the two activities be reduced to
a matter of taste, as soon as the following insights, which pertain
primarily to formalism but were first formulated in the intuitionistic
literature, are generally accepted. The acceptance of these insights
is only a question of time, since they are the results of pure reflec-
tion and hence contain no disputable element, so that anyone who
has once understood them must accept them. Two of the four in-
sights have so far been understood and accepted in the formalistic
literature. When the same state of affairs has been reached with
respect to the other two, it will mean the end of the controversy
concerning the foundations of mathematics.
First insight. The differentiation, among the formalistic endeav-
ors, between a construction of the ‘inventory of mathematical for-
mulas’ (formalistic view of mathematics) and an intuitive (con-
tentual)40 theory of the laws of this construction, as well as the
example Hilbert, Poincaré, Löwenheim, Skolem, and Von Neumann.
39. Brouwer makes the point in Brouwer 1928.
40. [The role of Brouwer’s ‘contentual’ mathematics’ corresponds to that of Reeb’s
‘mathematical reality’; but the former is richer than the latter.]
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recognition of the fact that for the latter theory the intuitionistic
mathematics of the set of natural numbers is indispensable.
Second insight. The rejection of the thoughtless use of the log-
ical principle of excluded middle, as well as the recognition, first,
of the fact that the investigation of the question why the principle
mentioned is justified and to what extent it is valid constitutes an
essential object of research in the foundations of mathematics, and,
second, of the fact that in intuitive (contentual) mathematics this
principle is valid only for finite systems.
Third insight. The identification of the principle of excluded
middle with the principle of the solvability of every mathematical
problem.
Fourth insight. The recognition of the fact that the (contentual)
justification of formalistic mathematics by means of the proof of
its consistency contains a vicious circle, since this justification rests
upon the (contentual) correctness of the proposition that from the
consistency of a proposition the correctness of the proposition fol-
lows, that is, upon the (contentual) correctness of the principle of
excluded middle. (Brouwer 1928, p.375, trl. van Heijenoort 1967,
pp.490–491)
The distinction in the First insight Brouwer had made first in Brouwer
1908, in which he had shown that ¬¬(P ∨ ¬P ), and in 1924 this led him
to comment on Hilbert’s aim of a consistency proof for formalised clas-
sical mathematics that ‘We need by no means despair of reaching this
goal’ (Brouwer 1924, p.3, trl. van Heijenoort 1967, p.336). In ‘Intuitionis-
tic reflections on formalism’ he added a proof that finite conjunctions of
instances of PEM are also consistent, and in his first Vienna lecture he
voiced the expectation that ‘An appropriate mechanization of the lan-
guage of this intuitionistically non-contradictory mathematics should
therefore deliver precisely what the formalist school has set as its goal’
(Brouwer 1929, p.164, trl. mine).
Against this background, the question that led Reeb to embrace IST
is (as I formulate it) the following. If for example the classical logic in the
formal theory is taken to be an idealisation of the constructive logic of
mathematical reality, is there, similarly, an aspect of constructive reality
that, when idealised, would lead to the notion of a standard number in
the formal theory? What is asked for is an intuitive motivation, for intro-
ducing the predicate ‘standard’ in the idealised theory IST, not a formal
proof (of the existence of formal nonstandard models).
Reeb answers that the standard numbers in a formal theory may be
seen as an idealisation of what he calls the naïve whole numbers in reality
(‘les entiers naïfs’). They are the numbers ‘that exist independently from
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the theory one uses to describe them’ (Reeb and Harthong, 1989, p.63),
and are obtained by just putting units together, Reeb’s (necessarily infor-
mal) definition is (Reeb 1979, p.277, p.286n3; Reeb 1989, p.152):
1. 0 is naïve;
2. if n is naïve, so is n+ 1;
3. No other n is naïve.
Although the property of being naïve is not in any sense vague, so there
is no threat of Wang’s Paradox,41 Reeb resists the argument by induc-
tion that the naïve numbers form a set in the classical sense, as we will
see in a moment. It should also be noted that Reeb’s position is dissoci-
ated from finitism: a naïve number may be constructed in an algorithm
or program of any complexity (Reeb and Harthong, 1989, section 15). It
is implied, then, that there is also a naïve notion of algorithm. This coin-
cides with the idea that formal recursion theory, if to be understood as a
theory of computability, presupposes such a pre-theoretical notion.42
At this point Reeb invokes Brouwer’s weak counterexamples to clas-
sical theorems. Assume the consistency of the formal theory and suppose
that there is a predicate A such that
• the formal theory proves ∃x¬A(x), or it can be shown that ∃x¬A(x)
is independent and we are willing to add it as an axiom;
• A and its evaluation at a naïve n can be understood in naïve terms,
• but we do not have yet a naïve construction for such a counterex-
ample.
In that case ZFC proves the formal existence of a natural number for
which we do not have a construction in reality yet. It is a formal num-
ber in the formal set N to which corresponds no naïve number in reality
(in any case not yet), and which is greater than any naïve number inter-
preted in the theory. Hence Reeb’s slogan Q: ‘The naïve whole numbers
do not fill N’ (‘Les naifs ne remplissent pas N’). At first, Reeb called Q an
observation (‘constat’), later a slogan (‘slogan’). As Salanskis points out,
the latter is much more appropriate, as seeing things the way Reeb does
41. Wang’s Paradox is: 0 is a small number; if n is a small number, so is n+ 1; there-
fore, all numbers are small. This has generated quite some discussion; the classical
papers are Dummett 1975 and Wright 1975.
42. Briefly, the point is that a recursive function is defined by a set of equations, and if
the function is to be considered as computable, there must be an effective method
to determine that set; but now to understand ‘effective’ as ’ recursive’ would be cir-
cular. A detailed presentation is given in Heyting 1958, pp. 340-342. For discussion
and further references, see Coquand 2014 and Sundholm 2014.
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is not a matter of direct perception but requires accepting a certain philo-
sophical view (Salanskis, 1994, p.29). Furthermore, it requires the convic-
tion that there always will be such predicates A that can be understood
and evaluated in naïvely.
Reeb supposed that Fermat’s conjecture provided such a predicate A,
writing, for example, in 1989:
Consider the unique object a in N defined by the formula (not well
formalised, but the reader will know how to write a perfect for-
mula):
If the statement known as Fermat’s Great Theorem is true,
a = 0, otherwise a = x+ y + z + n, where n > 3, x+yn = zn,
x, y, z > 1, and x, y, z and n chosen such that a is as small as
possible.
At the moment I am writing this, it is not possible to convince one-
self that a is naïve. (Reeb, 1989, p.152, trl. mine)
It follows from Wiles’ proof, published in 1995, that a = 0; one may think
of Goldbach’s conjecture instead. At times, Reeb did not invoke potential
examples and limited his motivation to pointing out that the existence of
such predicates A cannot be excluded.43 Of course, should a naïve num-
ber n be found such that ¬A(n), one looks for another predicate of that
type.44
The step to IST is made by idealising the distinction between the
(constructive) naïve numbers and the surplus of formal numbers in the
formal set N, whose existence is expressed in Q, to that between the clas-
sical standard ones and the nonstandard ones.45 Given the differences be-
tween the notions of constructive existence in reality and formal existence
in a classical theory, it is only to be expected that the idealisation will be
one by analogy:
43. Personal communication from Jean-Michel Salanskis, who was a member of Reeb’s
group.
44. For Reeb, a constructive proof can exist without having been found: ‘ou bien il y
a une démonstration constructive, déjà connue ou non . . . ’ (Reeb and Harthong,
1989, section 16). For Brouwer, on the contrary, the only sense in which a proof can
be said to exist is that it has been constructed. However, for the matter at hand
this makes no difference.
45. This idealisation need not lead to IST; it was the theory Reeb knew and liked, but
closely related axiomatic nonstandard theories have been developed in the mean-
time (Kanovei and Reeken, 2004). Just as in the natural sciences, different theories
of the same phenomena in reality may be developed, and have different theoretical
virtues.
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It is now a matter of drawing up a suitable list of simple and formal
properties verified (or simply suggested) by the naïve numbers, and
to consider the formal theory consisting of the statements on this
list together with the axioms of classical mathematics.
The theory known by the abbreviation IST developed by E. Nel-
son realises this program efficiently. But like every formal theory, it
does not escape observation Q (i.e., ‘The naïve numbers do not fill
the standard whole numbers of IST’). (Reeb, 1979, p.287, trl. mine)
To illustrate that last remark: the number a defined in terms of Fermat’s
Last Theorem exists classically and is unique, and hence, as was clear also
before Wiles’ demonstration, a standard object in IST (Theorem 7, page
7).
In ‘La mathématique non standard vieille de soixante ans ?’, Reeb
presents a beginning of such a list of properties of the naïve numbers,
which, somewhat abbreviated, runs as follows (Reeb, 1979, pp.278–279):46
Let ω be a fixed, non-naïve number.
• Property 1. If a is naïve, then ω > a.
• Property 2. . . . , ω − a, . . . , ω − 2, ω − 1, ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, . . . , ω + a, . . .
(where a is naïve) are non-naïve elements of N. Likewise, the follow-
ing elements of N are non-naïve (where a is naïve): ω2, ω3, . . . , ωa, . . . ,
[
ω
a
]
, a
√
ω
where [x] stands as usual for the whole part of x; pω, prime number
and pω > ω (such pω certainly exist). The number ω! is not naïve
and has every naïve whole number as divisor.
• Property 3. If a > 1 is naïve, then aω > ωa.
• Property 4. There exists no set X such that ‘x ∈ X ’ is equivalent to
‘x is a naïve whole number’.
• Property 5. Let X ⊂ N be a set such that n ∈ X for every naïve
n [respectively, ω ∈ X for every non-naïve ω]. Then there exists a
non-naïve α such that α ∈ X [respectively, a naïve a such that a ∈
X ].
• Property 6. If X is a set of which every element is a naïve whole
number, then X is finite.
46. As Salanskis emphasises (Salanskis, 1999, p.140), Reeb writes ‘properties’, not ‘the-
orems’, so as to distinguish assertions about reality from provable formulas in a
formal system.
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Reeb’s argument for Property 4 is that, if the naïve whole numbers
formed a set, then by induction this set would be identical to N, and that
would contradict Slogan Q.
If in this list one replaces ‘(non-)naïve number’ with ‘(non-)standard
number’, and construes these statements not contentually but formally,
one gets theorems of IST.
Reeb also notices (current) limitation of this motivation (Reeb, 1979,
p.287):
1. He should like to have a notion of ‘naïve object’ that extends be-
yond natural numbers. In the formal counterpart, IST, the predi-
cate ‘standard’ can be meaningfully applied to any set, hence to any
object in its universe (and thereby yield either a truth or a false-
hood); but Reeb does not have a correspondingly general notion of
construction. (Note that Reeb was aware of, but does not embrace,
Brouwer’s wider notion of constructivity.)
2. He has not been able to find a justification for the claim that when-
ever all naïve whole numbers have a certain internal property, all
numbers in N have it. (An analogue to Transfer.)
3. Likewise, while for a given naïve function such as ex it is easily
shown that an infinitesimal increase in the argument leads to an in-
finitesimal increase in the value, it remains to be shown that this is
equivalent to (ǫ − δ-)continuity of the function, which would require
an analogue to Standardization.
But Transfer and Standardization are, in their full generality, by and
large nonconstructive; see the fine-grained analysis by Sanders in Sanders
2017. Although Sanders’ analysis is concerned with relations of the for-
mal standard objects with the nonstandard ones, and not with Reeb’s
naïve objects, his results strongly suggest that such justifications as Reeb
hoped to find will not be forthcoming. That is far from saying that his
attempt to find a natural way into IST fails; but it does mean that the
idealisations involved in moving from the distinction between naïve and
non-naïve numbers to IST are stronger than perhaps was expected.47
To make the transition from the naïve numbers in reality to the stan-
dard numbers in IST more explicit, Reeb introduced a middle term, ‘Naïve’
(Reeb 1981, pp.453–454; Reeb 1989, pp.153–154). This term applies to all
objects whose existence in ZFC is established by proving a formula of the
47. This last consideration is one among several that leads to the question of construc-
tive analogues to IST (which was not a particular concern to Reeb, to whom, on
the contrary, the idea of using a classical formal theory was attractive). For this, I
refer to the papers mentioned in footnote 2.
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form
∃!xA(x)
This includes all naïve whole numbers, but much more: N, Q, R, P (N),
exp, sin, π, ... The key principle then would be: ‘There exists a finite set
F that contains every Naïve object. One could even decide to do non-
standard analysis using this informal concept. Reeb remarks that, on the
one hand, the advantage of doing this is allow one to reconstruct non-
standard analysis in a way of which the consistency and conservative-
ness are evident; on the other hand, as an informal concept Naïve may
be more difficult to work with than Nelson’s formal theory (Reeb, 1981,
p.154). Moreover, it would require quite a sophisticated argument to jus-
tify the key principle (Reeb, 1989, p.154). His conclusion is that ‘in this
sense, the formalized theory IST is superior to our consideration of Naïve
objects, whose interest is limited to the didactical or heuristic sphere’
(Reeb, 1981, p.154). It seems to me that, as a motivation for the intro-
duction of a distinction in an idealised formal theory, a good heuristic will
fit the bill.
As is clear from the list of four ‘insights’, the idea that one may simul-
taneously accept (not just finitary but even) intuitionistic mathematics
as true and formalized classical mathematics as consistent was shared
by Brouwer, who at the time was even optimistic about the prospects
of a formal consistency proof. Yet, Brouwer would not have called non-
standard analysis in the form of IST an idealised formal theory of the
mathematical reality that is the intuitive continuum. After all, IST is a
syntactical enrichment of ZFC and in particular of the theory of the clas-
sical real numbers, but is not an ontological enrichment of the latter. The
objects of IST are the classical real numbers. However, those can not be
construed as idealisations of intuitionistic choice sequences. This is clear-
est from the mathematical contrast provided by Brouwer’s strong coun-
terxamples, which show that the intuitive continuum of mathematical
reality, analysed in terms of choice sequences, has properties that in clas-
sical analysis with its discrete continuum are contradictory. (As we saw,
IST is, on the contrary, conservative over ZFC.) Illustrative are the fol-
lowing:
Theorem 29. ¬∀x ∈ R(x ∈ Q ∨ x 6∈ Q) (Brouwer, 1927)
Theorem 30. ¬∀x ∈ R(¬¬x > 0→ x > 0) (Brouwer, 1949a)
Theorem 31. ¬∀x ∈ R(x 6= 0→ x < 0 ∨ x > 0) (Brouwer, 1949b)
For Reeb these theorems are not relevant, as these they depend on in-
tuitionistic considerations that go beyond the finitary mathematics he
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accepts as mathematical reality.
9 Weyl and infinitesimal analysis
Overall, one suspects that to Brouwer, the glass that Reeb offers would
have seemed to be half empty, what with its essential involvement of a
formalism and its limitation of mathematical reality to the finitary.
For Weyl this would probably have been different. As is well known,
Weyl acknowledged the epistemological superiority of intuitionism in pure
mathematics:
With Brouwer, mathematics gains the highest intuitive clarity; his
doctrine is the culmination of idealism in mathematics.
However, Weyl continues:
But with pain the mathematician sees the greater part of his high-
rising theories dissolve into the fog. (Weyl, 1925, p.24)
Weyl had come to convince himself that it is necessary to abandon the
intuitionistic program because he took it to be a fact that intuitionistic
mathematics is not able to found the mathematics required in physics,
whereas ‘mathematics should put itself to the service of the natural sci-
ences’ (Weyl, 1926).48 This pushed Weyl towards a formalist foundation
of classical mathematics.49
In various physical contexts it is, conceptually, natural to apply non-
standard analysis, for example when phenomena are involved at greatly
different scales, or where the difference between the observable and the
unobservable plays a role.50 In a more foundational spirit, Robert notes
that, although tangent vectors can be said to represent infinitesimal dis-
placements at a point in a differentiable manifold, it would be impor-
48. For a detailed account of that episode, see for example Mancosu and Ryckman
2002, section 6.2.1 and Tieszen 2000, section 7. A recent philosophical discussion on
constructive mathematics in physics is Ardourel 2012.
49. But, as we have seen (the four ‘insights’, p. 25), Brouwerian intuitionism does not
exclude a formalist foundation of classical mathematics; it includes it as a proper
part. However, it is not the part of intuitionistic mathematics that is concerned
with the development of contentual mathematics; and the contentual mathematics
that Brouwer sought to develop is far richer than the minimum required to get the
formalist foundation going.
50. Given the properties of human vision, even at an everyday scale infinitesimal anal-
ysis can be useful, as shown by the analysis of the moiré effect in Harthong 1981.
Further applications are presented in, e.g., Cutland 1988, Arkeryd et al. 1997, and
Lobry and Sari 2008. A recent view from a philosopher of science is Wenmackers
2016.
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tant to have further analyses of differentiability and of continuity, nei-
ther of which can be based on the concept of a differential; a theory of
infinitesimals would be one, and moreover supply an algebra of differen-
tials (Robert, 1988, p.xiv).
That last remark brings us to Weyl’s infinitesimal geometry in his the-
ory of spacetime, and also to the quotation from Weyl with which this
paper begun. For, as Laugwitz aptly observed,
And even if Hermann Weyl declared the infinitesimals to have been
eliminated, his book Space-Time-Matter, widely available in several
editions since 1919, is a perfect example of infinitesimal mathemat-
ics in action. (Laugwitz, 1986, p.241, trl. mine)
Weyl’s infinitesimal geometry is not, in fact, constructive. The fundamen-
tal notions are introduced axiomatically, instead of being constructed out
of basic intuition, and the proof of uniqueness of Pythagorean metric of
1922 is, in its dependence on the excluded middle, classical.51
Brouwer, no less of an idealist than Weyl, always was a convention-
alist about the structure of physical space: ‘a question of convenience, of
taste, or of custom’, he wrote in 1909, in a paper to which in a reprint of
1919 he added a note stating that the general theory of relativity ‘would
not affect the conclusions on the theory of knowledge’ he had reached
(Brouwer 1909, p.14, trl. Brouwer 1975, p.116; Brouwer 1919, p.vi, trl. Brouwer
1975, p.120).
Weyl was well aware of the discrepancy between his constructivist phi-
losophy of pure mathematics and his classical practice in mathematical
physics. Did Weyl ever hope to give his infinitesimal geometry a construc-
tive foundation later – Brouwer had taken that attitude towards his own
theorems in classical topology –, 52 and can a notion of subjectivity be
motivated that supports, as Weyl’s philosophical foundation of physics re-
quires, the idea of a subject located in a point and whose intuitive space
is of infinitesimal size53 without, at the same time, idealising beyond a
notion of subject appropriate for constructive mathematics? To investi-
gate these questions would go beyond the scope of the present paper. But
51. On Weyl’s non-constructive mathematics in physics, see Weyl 1922, p.146; Weyl
1988, p.7; Scholz 2001, pp.95–97; and Eckes 2011, pp.277, 608–610, 777–778.
52. In a retrospective remark of 1920 Brouwer wrote that, when he had just begun to
develop intuitionism, ‘in my contemporary philosophy-free mathematical papers
I have frequently also used the old [i.e., non-intuitionistic] methods, trying how-
ever to derive only such results as could be hoped to find, after the completion of a
systematic construction of intuitionistic set theory, a place in the new system and
claim a value, perhaps in modified form.’ (Brouwer, 1920, p.204, trl. mine)
53. See in particular Bernard 2013, pp. 246–248, and Bernard’s instructive, unpub-
lished manuscript Bernard.
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if there is no construction allowing to treat infinitesimals as individual
objects, then to Weyl, Reeb’s approach, what with its combination of a
classical formalism for nonstandard analysis and a nevertheless intuition-
istic epistemology, might have made the glass seem at least half full.54
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